Optimal Resource Allocation over Networks via Lottery-Based Mechanisms by Phade, Soham R. & Anantharam, Venkat
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
00
50
1v
1 
 [e
co
n.T
H]
  3
 D
ec
 20
18
Optimal Resource Allocation over Networks via
Lottery-Based Mechanisms
Soham R. Phade and Venkat Anantharam*†
Abstract
We show that, in a resource allocation problem, the ex ante aggre-
gate utility of players with cumulative-prospect-theoretic preferences
can be increased over deterministic allocations by implementing lotter-
ies. We formulate an optimization problem, called the system prob-
lem, to find the optimal lottery allocation. The system problem exhibits
a two-layer structure comprised of a permutation profile and optimal
allocations given the permutation profile. For any fixed permutation
profile, we provide a market-based mechanism to find the optimal allo-
cations and prove the existence of equilibrium prices. We show that the
system problem has a duality gap, in general, and that the primal prob-
lem is NP-hard. We then consider a relaxation of the system problem
and derive some qualitative features of the optimal lottery structure.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of congestion management in a network, and re-
source allocation amongst heterogeneous users, in particular human agents,
with varying preferences. This is a well-recognized problem in network
economics, with applications to transportation and telecommunication net-
works, energy smart grids, information and financial networks, labor mar-
kets and social networks, to name a few [20]. Market-based solutions have
proven to be very useful for this purpose, with varied mechanisms, such as
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auctions and fixed rate pricing [9]. In this paper, we consider a lottery-based
mechanism, as opposed to the deterministic allocations studied in the lit-
erature. We mainly ask the following questions: (i) Do lotteries provide an
advantage over deterministic implementations? (ii) If yes, then does there exist
a market-based mechanism to implement an optimum lottery?
In order to answer the first question we need to define our goal in allocat-
ing resources. There is an extensive literature on the advantages of lotteries:
Eckhoff [7] and Stone [25] hold that lotteries are used because of fairness
concerns; Boyce [3] argues that lotteries are effective to reduce rent-seeking
from speculators; Morgan [19] shows that lotteries are an effective way of fi-
nancing public goods through voluntary funds, when the entity raising funds
lacks tax power; Hylland and Zeckhauser [10] propose implementing lotter-
ies to elicit honest preferences and allocate jobs efficiently. In all of these
works, there is an underlying assumption, which is also one of the key rea-
sons for the use of lotteries, that the goods to be allocated are indivisible.
However, we notice lotteries being implemented even when the goods to
be allocated are divisible, for example in lottos and parimutuel betting. In
several experiments [21], it has been observed that lottery-based rewards
are more appealing than deterministic rewards of the same expected value,
and thus provide an advantage in maximizing the desired influence on peo-
ple’s behavior. We also observe several firms presenting lottery-based offers
to incentivize customers into buying their products or using their services,
and in return to improve their revenues. Thus, although lottery-based mech-
anisms are being widely implemented, a theoretical understanding for the
same seems to be lacking. This is one of the motivations for this paper, which
aims to justify the use of lottery-based mechanisms, based on models coming
from behavioral economics for how humans evaluate options.
We take a utilitarian approach of maximizing the ex ante aggregate util-
ity or the net happiness of the players. (See [1] and the references therein
for the relation with other goals such as maximizing revenue.) We model
each player’s utility using cumulative prospect theory (CPT), a framework
pioneered by Tversky and Kahneman [27], which is believed, based on ex-
tensive experimentation with human subjects [4], to form a better theory
with which to model human behavior when faced with prospects than is
expected utility theory (EUT) [28]. It is important to emphasize that CPT
includes EUT as a special case and therefore provides a strict generalization
of existing modeling techniques.
CPT posits a probability weighting function that, along with the ordering
of the allocation outcomes in a lottery, dictates the probabilistic sensitivity of a
player (details in Section 2), a property that plays an important role in lotter-
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ies and gambling. As Boyce [3] points out, “it is the lure of getting the good
without having to pay for it that gives allocation by lottery its appeal.” The
probability weighting function typically over-weights small probabilities and
under-weights large probabilities, and this captures the “lure” effect. CPT
also posits a reference point that divides the prospect outcomes into gains
and losses domains in order to model the loss aversion of the players. In
order to focus on the effects of probabilistic sensitivity, and to avoid the com-
plications resulting from reference point considerations, we assume that the
reference point of all the players is equal to 0, and we consider prospects with
only nonnegative outcomes. This is, in fact, identical to the rank dependent
utility (RDU) model [22].
We will mainly be concerned with the framework considered in [13],
that of throughput control in the internet with elastic traffic. However, this
framework is general enough to have applications to network resource allo-
cation problems arising in several other domains. Kelly suggested that the
throughput allocation problem be posed as one of achieving maximum aggre-
gate utility for the users. A market is proposed, in which each user submits
an amount she is willing to pay per unit time to the network based on ten-
tative rates that she received from the network; the network accepts these
submitted amounts and determines the price of each network link. A user
is then allocated a throughput in proportion to her submitted amount and
inversely proportional to the sum of the prices of the links she wishes to use.
Under certain assumptions, Kelly shows that there exist equilibrium prices
and throughput allocations, and that these allocations achieve maximum ag-
gregate utility. Thus the overall system problem of maximizing aggregate
utility is decomposed into a network problem and several user problems, one
for each individual user. Further, in [14], the authors have proposed two
classes of algorithms which can be used to implement a relaxation of the
above optimization problem.
Instead of allocating a single throughput, we consider allocating a prospect
of throughputs to each user. Such a prospect consists of a finite set of through-
puts and a probability assigned to each of these throughputs, with the in-
terpretation that one of these throughputs would be realized with its cor-
responding probability (see Section 2 for the definition). We then ask the
question of finding the optimum allocation profile of prospects, one for each
user, comprised of throughputs and associated probabilities for that user, that
maximizes the aggregate utility of all the players, and is also feasible. An al-
location profile of prospects for each user is said to be feasible if it can be im-
plemented, i.e. there exists a probability distribution over feasible through-
put allocations whose marginals for each player agree with their allocated
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prospects.
If all the players have EUT utility with concave utility function, as is typ-
ically assumed to model risk-averseness, one can show that there exists a
feasible deterministic allocation that achieves the optimum and hence there
is no need to consider lotteries. However, if the players’ utility is modeled by
CPT, then one can improve over the best aggregate utility obtained through
deterministic allocations.
For example, Quiggin [23] considers the problem of distributing a fixed
amount amongst several homogeneous players with RDU preferences. He
concludes that, under certain conditions on players’ RDU preferences, the
optimum allocation system is a lottery scheme with a few large prizes and a
large number of small prizes, and is strictly preferred over distributing the
total amount deterministically amongst the players. In Section 5, we extend
these results to network settings with heterogeneous players.
In Section 2, we describe the network model, the lottery structure, and
the CPT model of player utility. We formulate an optimization problem,
called the system problem, to find the optimum lottery scheme. The solu-
tion of such an optimization problem, as explained in Section 2, exhibits a
layered structure of finding a permutation profile, and corresponding feasi-
ble throughput allocations. The permutation profile dictates in which order
throughput allocations for each player are coupled together for network fea-
sibility purposes. A player’s CPT value for her lottery allocation depends only
on the order amongst her own throughputs, and not on the coupling with the
other players.
Given a permutation profile, the problem of finding optimum feasible
throughput allocations is a convex programming problem, which we call the
fixed-permutation system problem, and leads to a nice price mechanism. In
Section 3, we prove the existence of equilibrium prices that decompose the
fixed-permutation system problem into a network problem and several user
problems, one for each player, as in [13]. The prices can be interpreted as
the cost imposed on the players and can be implemented in several forms,
such as waiting times in waiting-line auctions or first-come-first-served allo-
cations [2, 26], delay or packet loss in the Internet TCP protocol [17, 15],
efforts or resources invested by players in a contest [18, 6], or simply money
or reward points.
Finding the optimum permutation profile, on the other hand, is a non-
convex problem. In Section 4, we study the duality gap in the system problem
and consider a relaxation of the system problem by allowing the permuta-
tions to be doubly stochastic matrices instead of restricting them to be per-
mutation matrices. We show that strong duality holds in the relaxed system
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problem and so it has value equal to the dual of the original system problem
(Theorem 4.2). We also consider the problem where link constraints hold
in expectation, called the average system problem, and show that strong du-
ality holds in this case and so it has value equal to the relaxed problem. In
Section 5, we study the average system problem in further detail, and prove a
result on the structure of optimal lotteries. Example 4.3, establishes that the
duality gap in the original system problem can be nonzero and Theorem 4.4
shows that the primal system problem is NP-hard. In Section 6, we conclude
with some open problems for future research.
2 Model
Consider a network with a set [m] = {1, . . . ,m} of resources or links and a
set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of users or players. Let cj > 0 denote the finite capacity
of link j ∈ [m] and let c := (cj)j∈[m] ∈ R
m. (All vectors, unless otherwise
specified, will be treated as column vectors.) Each user i has a fixed route
Ji, which is a non-empty subset of [m]. Let A be an n × m matrix, where
Aij = 1 if link j ∈ Ji, and Aij = 0 otherwise. Let x := (xi)i∈[n] ∈ R
n
+ denote
an allocation profile where user i is allocated the throughput xi ≥ 0 that
flows through the links in the route Ji. We say that an allocation profile x is
feasible if it satisfies the capacity constraints of the network, i.e., ATx ≤ c,
where the inequality is coordinatewise. Let F denote the set of all feasible
allocation profiles. We assume that the network constraints are such that F
is bounded, and hence a polytope.
Instead of allocating a fixed throughput xi to player i ∈ [n], we consider
allocating her a lottery (or a prospect)
Li := {(pi(1), yi(1)), . . . , (pi(ki), yi(ki))}, (2.1)
where yi(li) ≥ 0, li ∈ [ki], denotes a throughput and pi(li), li ∈ [ki], is the
probability with which throughput yi(li) is allocated. We assume the lottery
to be exhaustive, i.e.
∑
li∈[ki]
pi(li) = 1. (Note that we are allowed to have
pi(li) = 0 for some values of li ∈ [ki] and yi(l
1
i ) = yi(l
2
i ) for some l
1
i , l
2
i ∈ [ki].)
Let L = (Li, i ∈ [n]) denote a lottery profile, where each player i is allocated
lottery Li.
We now describe the CPT model we use to measure the “utility” or “hap-
piness” derived by each player from her lottery (for more details see [29]).
Each player i is associated with a value function vi : R+ → R+ that is con-
tinuous, differentiable, concave, and strictly increasing, and a probability
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weighting function wi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] that is continuous, strictly increasing
and satisfies wi(0) = 0 and wi(1) = 1.
For the prospect Li in (2.1), let πi : [ki]→ [ki] be a permutation such that
zi(1) ≥ zi(2) ≥ · · · ≥ zi(ki), (2.2)
and
yi(li) = zi(πi(li)) for all li ∈ [ki]. (2.3)
The prospect Li can equivalently be written as
Li = {(p˜i(1), zi(1)); . . . ; (p˜i(ki), zi(ki))},
where p˜i(li) := pi(π
−1
i (li)) for all li ∈ [ki]. The CPT value of prospect Li
for player i is evaluated using the value function vi(·) and the probability
weighting function wi(·) as follows:
Vi(Li) :=
ki∑
li=1
dli(pi, πi)vi(zi(li)), (2.4)
where dli(pi, πi) are the decision weights given by d1(pi, πi) := wi(p˜i(1)) and
dli(pi, πi) := wi(p˜i(1) + · · ·+ p˜i(li))− wi(p˜i(1) + · · · + p˜i(li − 1)),
for 1 < li ≤ ki. Although the expression on the right in equation (2.4)
depends on the permutation πi, one can check that the formula evaluates to
the same value Vi(Li) as long as πi satisfies (2.2) and (2.3). The CPT value
of prospect Li, can equivalently be written as
Vi(Li) =
ki∑
li=1
wi
( li∑
si=1
p˜i(si)
)
[vi(zi(li))− vi(zi(li + 1)))] ,
where zi(ki+1) := 0. Thus the lowest allocation zi(ki) is weighted bywi(1) =
1, and every increment in the value of the allocations, vi(zi(li)) − vi(zi(li +
1)),∀li ∈ [ki − 1], is weighted by the probability weighting function of the
probability of receiving an allocation at least equal to zi(li).
For any finite set S, let∆(S) denote the standard simplex of all probabil-
ity distributions on the set S, i.e.,
∆(S) := {(p(s), s ∈ S)|p(s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S,
∑
s∈S
p(s) = 1}.
Thus pi := (pi(li))li∈[ki] ∈ ∆([ki]). We say that a lottery profile L is feasi-
ble if there exists a joint distribution p ∈ ∆(
∏
i[ki]) such that the following
conditions are satisfied:
6
(i) Themarginal distributions agreewithLi for all players i, i.e.
∑
l−i
p(li, l−i) =
pi(li) for all li ∈ [ki], where l−i in the summation ranges over values in∏
i′ 6=i[ki′ ].
(ii) For each (li)i∈[n] ∈
∏
i[ki] in the support of the distribution p (i.e.
p((li)i∈[n]) > 0), the allocation profile (yi(li))i∈[n] is feasible.
The distribution p and the throughputs (yi(li), i ∈ [n], li ∈ [ki]) of a feasi-
ble lottery profile together define a lottery scheme. In the following, we re-
strict our attention to specific types of lottery schemes, wherein the network
implements with equal probability one of the k allocation profiles y(l) :=
(yi(l))i∈[n] ∈ R
n
+, for l ∈ [k]. Let [k] = {1, . . . , k} denote the set of outcomes,
where allocation profile yi(l) is implemented if outcome l occurs. Clearly,
such a scheme is feasible iff each of the allocation profiles y(l),∀l ∈ [k] be-
longs to F . Player i thus faces the prospect Li = {(1/k, yi(l))}kl=1 and such a
lottery scheme is completely characterized by the tuple y := (yi(l), i ∈ [n], l ∈
[k]). By taking k large enough, any lottery scheme can be approximated by
such a scheme.
Let yi := (yi(l))l∈[k] ∈ R
k
+. Let zi := (zi(l))l∈[k] ∈ R
k
+ be a vector and
πi : [k]→ [k] be a permutation such that
zi(1) ≥ zi(2) ≥ · · · ≥ zi(k),
and
yi(l) = zi(πi(l)) for all l ∈ [k].
Note that yi is completely characterized by πi and zi. Then player i’s CPT
value will be
Vi(Li) =
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l)),
where hi(l) := wi(l/k)−wi((l− 1)/k) for l ∈ [k]. Let hi := (hi(l))l∈[k] ∈ R
k
+.
Note that hi(l) > 0 for all i, l, since the weighting functions are assumed to
be strictly increasing.
Looking at the lottery scheme y in terms of individual allocation profiles
zi and permutations πi for all players i ∈ [n], allows us to separate those
features of y that affect individual preferences and those that pertain to the
network implementation. We will later see that the problem of optimizing
aggregate utility can be decomposed into two layers: (i) a convex problem
that optimizes over resource allocations, and (ii) a non-convex problem that
finds the optimal permutation profile.
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Let z := (zi(l), i ∈ [n], l ∈ [k]), π := (πi, i ∈ [n]), h := (hi(l), i ∈ [n], l ∈
[k]) and v := (vi(·), i ∈ [n]). Let Sk denote the set of all permutations of [k].
The problem of optimizing aggregate utility
∑
i Vi(Li) subject to the lottery
scheme being feasible, can be formulated as follows:
SYS[z, π;h, v,A, c]
Maximize
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
subject to
∑
i∈Rj
zi(πi(l)) ≤ cj ,∀j ∈ [m],∀l ∈ [k],
zi(l) ≥ zi(l + 1),∀i ∈ [n],∀l ∈ [k],
πi ∈ Sk,∀i ∈ [n].
Here Rj := {i ∈ [n]|j ∈ Ji} is the set of all players whose route uses link j.
We set zi(k + 1) = 0 for all i, and the zi(k + 1) are not treated as variables.
This takes care of the condition zi(l) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n], l ∈ [k].
3 Equilibrium
The system problem SYS[z, π;h, v,A, c] optimizes over z and π. In this sec-
tion we fix πi ∈ Sk for all i and optimize over z. Let us denote this fixed-
permutation system problem by SYS_FIX[z;π, h, v,A, c].
SYS_FIX[z;π, h, v,A, c]
Maximize
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
subject to
∑
i∈Rj
zi(πi(l)) ≤ cj ,∀j ∈ [m],∀l ∈ [k],
zi(l) ≥ zi(l + 1),∀i ∈ [n],∀l ∈ [k].
(In contrast with SYS(z, π; . . . ), in SYS_FIX(z;π, . . . ), the permutation π is
thought of as being fixed.) Since vi(·) is assumed to be a concave function
and hi(l) > 0 for all i, l, this problem has a concave objective function with
linear constraints. For all j ∈ [m], l ∈ [k], let λj(l) ≥ 0 be the dual variables
corresponding to the constraints
∑
i∈Rj
zi(πi(l)) ≤ cj respectively, and for
all i ∈ [n], l ∈ [k], let αi(l) ≥ 0 be the dual variables corresponding to the
constraints zi(l) ≥ zi(l+ 1) respectively. Let λ := (λj(l), j ∈ [m], l ∈ [k]) and
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α := (αi(t), i ∈ [n], l ∈ [k]). Then the Lagrangian for the fixed-permutation
system problem SYS_FIX[z;π, h, v,A, c] can be written as follows:
L (z;α, λ) :=
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
+
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
αi(l)[zi(l)− zi(l + 1)] +
m∑
j=1
k∑
l=1
λj(l)[cj −
∑
i∈Rj
zi(πi(l))]
=
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1

hi(l)vi(zi(l)) + (αi(l)− αi(l − 1))zi(l)−

∑
j∈Ji
λj(π
−1
i (l))

 zi(l)


+
m∑
j=1
k∑
l=1
λj(l)cj ,
where αi(0) = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect
to zi(l) we get,
∂L(z;α, λ)
∂zi(l)
= hi(l)v
′
i(zi(l)) + αi(l)− αi(l − 1)−

∑
j∈Ji
λj(π
−1
i (l))

 .
Let
ρi(l) :=
∑
j∈Ji
λj(π
−1
i (l)), (3.1)
for all i ∈ [n], l ∈ [k]. This can be interpreted as the price per unit throughput
for player i for her l-th largest allocation zi(l). The price of the lottery zi for
player i is given by
∑k
l=1 ρi(l)zi(l), or equivalently,
k∑
l=1
ri(l) [zi(l)− zi(l + 1)] ,
where
ri(l) :=
l∑
s=1
ρi(s), for all l ∈ [k]. (3.2)
For l ∈ [k−1], αi(l) can be interpreted as a transfer of a nonnegative price
for player i from her l-th largest allocation to her (l+1)-th largest allocation.
Since the allocation zi(l+1) cannot be greater than the allocation zi(l), there
is a subsidy of αi(l) in the price of zi(l) and an equal surcharge of αi(l) in the
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price of zi(l+1). This subsidy and surcharge is nonzero (and hence positive)
only if the constraint is binding, i.e. zi(l) = zi(l + 1). On the other hand,
αi(k) is a subsidy in price given to player i for her lowest allocation, since
she cannot be charged anything higher than the marginal utility at her zero
allocation.
Let hi := (hi(l))l∈[k] ∈ R
k
+. Consider the following user problem for
player i:
USER[mi; ri, hi, vi]
Maximize
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi
(
k∑
s=l
mi(s)
ri(s)
)
−
k∑
l=1
mi(l)
subject to mi(l) ≥ 0,∀l ∈ [k],
(3.3)
where ri := (ri(l), l ∈ [k]) is a vector of rates such that
0 < ri(1) ≤ ri(2) ≤ · · · ≤ ri(k). (3.4)
We can interpret this as follows: User i is charged rate ri(k) for her lowest
allocation δi(k) := zi(k). Let mi(k) denote the budget spent on the lowest
allocation and hence mi(k) = ri(k)δi(k). For 1 ≤ l < k, she is charged rate
ri(l) for the additional allocation δi(l) := zi(l) − zi(l + 1), beyond zi(l + 1)
up to the next lowest allocation zi(l). Let mi(l) denote the budget spent on
l-th additional allocation and hence mi(l) = ri(l)δi(l).
Let m := (mi(l), i ∈ [n], l ∈ [k]) and δ := (δi(l), i ∈ [n], l ∈ [k]). Consider
the following network problem:
NET[δ;m,π,A, c]
Maximize
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
mi(l) log(δi(l))
subject to δi(l) ≥ 0,∀i,∀l,∑
i∈Rj
k∑
s=pii(l)
δi(s) ≤ cj ,∀j,∀l.
This is the well known Eisenberg-Gale convex program [8] and it can be
solved efficiently. Kelly et al. [14] proposed continuous time algorithms for
finding equilibrium prices and allocations. For results on polynomial time
algorithms for these problems see [11, 5]. We have the following decompo-
sition result:
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Theorem 3.1. For any fixed π, there exist equilibrium parameters r∗,m∗, δ∗
and z∗ such that
(i) for each player i, m∗i solves the user problem USER[mi; r
∗
i , hi, vi],
(ii) δ∗ solves the network problem NET[δ;m∗, π,A, c],
(iii) m∗i (l) = δ
∗
i (l)r
∗
i (l) for all i, l,
(iv) δ∗i (l) = z
∗
i (l)− z
∗
i (l + 1) for all i, l, and
(v) z∗ solves the fixed-permutation system problem SYS_FIX[z;π, h, v,A, c].
Proof. Since SYS_FIX[z;π, h, v,A, c] is a convex optimization problem, we
know that there exist z∗ = (z∗i (l), i ∈ [n], l ∈ [k]), α
∗ = (α∗i (l), i ∈ [n], l ∈ [k])
and λ∗ = (λ∗j (l), j ∈ [m], l ∈ [k]) such that
hi(l)v
′
i(z
∗
i (l)) = ρ
∗
i (l)− α
∗
i (l) + α
∗
i (l − 1),∀i,∀l, (3.5)
z∗i (l) ≥ z
∗
i (l + 1), α
∗
i (l) ≥ 0, α
∗
i (l)(z
∗
i (l)− z
∗
i (l + 1)) = 0,∀i,∀l, (3.6)∑
i∈Rj
z∗i (πi(l)) ≤ cj , λ
∗
j(l) ≥ 0, λ
∗
j(l)[cj −
∑
i∈Rj
z∗i (πi(l))] = 0,∀j,∀l, (3.7)
where
ρ∗i (l) :=
∑
j∈Ji
λ∗j(π
−1
i (l)),
and such that z∗ solves the fixed-permutation system problemSYS_FIX[z;π, h, v,A, c].
Hence statement (v) holds for this choice of z∗. Let r∗i (l) :=
∑l
s=1 ρ
∗
i (s),
δ∗i (l) := z
∗
i (l) − z
∗
i (l + 1) and m
∗
i (l) := δ
∗
i (l)r
∗
i (l) for all i, l. From (3.5), we
have ρ∗i (1) > 0, because vi(·) is strictly increasing, hi(1) > 0 and α
∗
i (0) = 0.
Thus, the rate vector r∗i satisfies (3.4) for all i. Also note that, by construction,
the vectors r∗, δ∗, z∗ and m∗ satisfy statements (iii) and (iv) of the theorem.
We now show that statement (i) holds. Fix a player i. Observe that
the user problem USER[mi; r
∗
i , hi, vi] has a concave objective function since
hi(l) > 0, r
∗
i (l) > 0 and vi(·) is concave. Differentiating the objective function
of the user problem USER[mi; r
∗
i , hi, vi] with respect tomi(l) atmi = m
∗
i , we
get
l∑
s=1
hi(s)v
′
i(z
∗
i (s))
r∗i (l)
− 1.
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From (3.5), we have
l∑
s=1
hi(s)v
′
i(z
∗
i (l)) =
l∑
s=1
ρ∗i (s)− α
∗
i (l)
= r∗i (l)− α
∗
i (l).
Thus,
l∑
s=1
hi(s)v
′
i(z
∗
i (s))
r∗i (l)
− 1 = −
α∗i (l)
r∗i (l)
≤ 0,
where equality holds iff α∗i (l) = 0. If m
∗
i (l) > 0, then δ
∗
i (l) > 0 and hence,
by (3.6), α∗i (l) = 0. Since this holds for all l ∈ [k], these are precisely the
conditions necessary and sufficient for the optimality of m∗i in the problem
of user i, it being a convex problem.
We now show that statement (ii) holds. The Lagrangian corresponding
to the network problem NET[δ;m∗, π,A, c] can be written as follows:
L(δ;µ) =
∑
i
k∑
l=1
m∗i (l) log(δi(l)) +
∑
j
∑
l
µj(l)

cj − ∑
i∈Rj
k∑
s=pii(l)
δi(s)

 ,
where µj(l) is the dual variable corresponding to the link constraint and µ :=
(µj(l), j ∈ [n], l ∈ [k]). Let µj(l) = λ
∗
j (l). If m
∗
i (l) > 0, then δ
∗
i (l) > 0, and
differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to δi(l) at δ
∗
i (l), we get
∂L(δ;λ∗)
∂δi(l)
∣∣∣∣∣
δi(l)=δ∗i (l)
=
m∗i (l)
δ∗i (l)
−
∑
j∈Ji
l∑
s=1
λ∗j (π
−1
i (s))
= r∗i (l)−
l∑
s=1
ρ∗i (s) = 0.
If m∗i (l) = 0, then
∂L(δ;λ∗)
∂δi(l)
∣∣
δi(l)=δ∗i (l)
≤ 0 since λ∗j (l) ≥ 0 for all j, l. Further,
from (3.7), we have λ∗j(l)
[
cj −
∑
i∈Rj
∑k
s=pii(l)
δ∗i (s)
]
= 0 for all j, l. Thus,
δ∗ solves the network problem NET[δ;m∗, π,A, c].
Thus the fixed-permutation system problem can be decomposed into user
problems – one for each player – and a network problem, for any fixed per-
mutation profile π. Similar to the framework in [14], we have an iterative
process as follows: The network presents each user i with a rate vector ri.
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Each user solves the user problem USER[mi; ri, hi, vi], and submits their bud-
get vectormi, The network collects these budget vectors (mi)i∈[n] and solves
the network problem NET[δ;m∗, π,A, c] to get the corresponding allocation
z (which can be computed from the incremental allocations δ) and the dual
variables λ. The network then computes the rate vectors corresponding to
each user from these dual variables as given by (3.1) and (3.2) and presents it
to the users as updated rates. Theorem 3.1 shows that the fixed-permutation
system problem of maximizing the aggregate utility is solved at the equilib-
rium of the above iterative process. If the value functions vi(·) are strictly
concave, then one can show that the optimal lottery allocation z∗ for the
fixed-permutation system problem is unique. However, the dual variables λ,
and hence the rates ri,∀i, need not be unique. Nonetheless, if one uses the
continuous-time algorithm proposed in [14] to solve the network problem,
then a similar analysis as in [14], based on Lyapunov stability, shows that
the above iterative process converges to the equilibrium lottery allocation z∗.
One of the permutation profiles, say π∗, solves the system problem. In
the next section, we explore this in more detail. However, it is interesting to
note that, for any fixed permutation profile π, any deterministic solution is
a special case of the lottery scheme y with permutation profile π. Thus, it
is guaranteed that the solution of the fixed-permutation system problem for
any permutation profile π is at least as good as any deterministic allocation.
Here is a simple example, where a lottery-based allocation leads to strict
improvement over deterministic allocations.
Example 3.2. Consider a network with n players and a single link with capac-
ity c. Let n = 10 and c = 10. For all players i, we employ the value functions
and weighting functions suggested by Kahneman and Tversky [27], given by
vi(xi) = x
βi
i , βi ∈ [0, 1],
and
wi(pi) =
pγii
(pγi + (1− p)γi)1/γi
, γi ∈ (0, 1],
respectively. We take βi = 0.88 and γi = 0.61 for all i ∈ [n]. These parameters
were reported as the best fits to the empirical data in [27]. The probability
weighting function is displayed in Figure 1.
By symmetry and concavity of the value function vi(·), the optimal deter-
ministic allocation is given by allocating c/n to each player i. The aggregate
utility for this allocation is n ∗ v1(c/n) = 10.
Now consider the following lottery allocation: Let k = n = 10. Let πi(l)−
1 = l + i(mod k) for all i ∈ [n] and l ∈ [k]. Let x ∈ [c/n, c] and zi(1) = x
13
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Figure 1: Probability weighting function
for all i ∈ [n] and zi(l) = (c − x)/(n − 1) for all i ∈ [n] and l = 2, . . . , k.
Note that this is a feasible lottery allocation. Such a lottery scheme can be
interpreted as follows: Select a “winning” player uniformly at random from
all the players. Allocate her a reward x and equally distribute the remaining
reward c − x amongst the rest of the players. The ex ante aggregate utility
is given by
n ∗ [w1(1/n)v1(x) + (1− w1(1/n))v1((c− x)/(n − 1))] .
This function achieves its maximumequal to 14.1690 at x = 9.7871. Thus, the
above proposed lottery improves the aggregate utility over any deterministic
allocation. The optimum lottery allocation is at least as good as 14.1690.
4 Optimum permutation profile and duality gap
The system problem SYS[z, π;h, v,A, c] can equivalently be formulated as
max
pii∈Sk∀i,
z:zi(l)≥zi(l+1)∀i,l
min
λ≥0
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
+
m∑
j=1
k∑
l=1
λj(l)

cj − ∑
i∈Rj
zi(πi(l))

 .
(I)
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LetWps denote the value of this problem. It is equal to the optimum value of
the system problem SYS[z, π;h, v,A, c]. By interchanging the max and min,
we obtain the following dual problem:
min
λ≥0
max
pii∈Sk∀i,
z:zi(l)≥zi(l+1)∀i,l
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
+
m∑
j=1
k∑
l=1
λj(l)

cj − ∑
i∈Rj
zi(πi(l))

 .
(II)
LetWds denote the value of this dual problem. By weak duality, we know that
Wps ≤Wds. For a fixed λ ≥ 0 and a fixed z that satisfies zi(l) ≥ zi(l+1),∀i, l,
the optimum permutation profile π in the dual problem (II) should minimize
m∑
j=1
k∑
l=1
λj(l)
∑
i∈Rj
zi(πi(l)),
which equals ∑
i
∑
l
ρˆi(l)zi(πi(l)),
Here ρˆi(l) :=
∑
j∈Ji
λj(l), is the price per unit allocation for player i under
outcome l. Since the numbers zi(l) are ordered in descending order, any
optimal permutation πi must satisfy
ρˆi(π
−1
i (1)) ≤ ρˆi(π
−1
i (2)) ≤ · · · ≤ ρˆi(π
−1
i (k)). (4.1)
In other words, any optimal permutation profile π of the dual problem (II)
must allocate throughputs in the order opposite to that of the prices ρˆi(l).
Lemma 4.1. If strong duality holds between the problems (I) and (II), then
any optimum permutation profile π∗ satisfies (4.1) for all i.
We prove this lemma in Appendix A. In general, there is a non-zero du-
ality gap between the problems (I) and (II) (see Example 4.3 for such an
example where the optimum permutation profile π∗ does not satisfy (4.1)).
The permutation πi can be represented by a k × k permutation matrix
Mi, where Mi(s, t) = 1 if πi(s) = t andMi(s, t) = 0 otherwise, for s, t ∈ [k].
The network constraints
∑
i∈Rj
zi(πi(l)) ≤ cj ,∀l ∈ [k], can equivalently be
written as
∑
i∈Rj
Mizi ≤ cj1, where 1 denotes a vector of appropriate size
with all its elements equal to 1, and the inequality is coordinatewise. A
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possible relaxation of the system problem is to consider doubly stochastic
matricesMi instead of restricting them to be permutation matrices. A matrix
is said to be doubly stochastic if all its entries are nonnegative and each row
and column sums up to 1. A permutation matrix is hence a doubly stochastic
matrix. Let Ωk denote the set of all doubly stochastic k × k matrices and let
Ω∗k denote the set of all k × k permutation matrices.
LetM = (Mi, i ∈ [n]) denote a profile of doubly stochastic matrices. The
relaxed system problem can then be written as follows:
SYS_REL[z,M ;h, v,A, c]
Maximize
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
subject to
∑
i∈Rj
Mizi ≤ cj1,∀j,
zi(l) ≥ zi(l + 1),∀i,∀l,
Mi ∈ Ωk,∀i.
Then the corresponding primal problem can be written as follows:
max
Mi∈Ωk∀i,
z:zi(l)≥zi(l+1)∀l,∀i
min
λj≥0,∀j
∑
i
∑
l
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
+
∑
j
λTj

cj1− ∑
i∈Rj
Mizi

 .
(III)
where λj = (λj(l))l∈[k] ∈ R
k
+. Let Wpr denote the value of this problem.
Interchanging min and max we get the corresponding dual:
min
λj≥0,∀j
max
Mi∈Ωk∀i,
z:zi(l)≥zi(l+1)∀l,∀i
∑
i
∑
l
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
+
∑
j
λTj

cj1− ∑
i∈Rj
Mizi

 .
(IV)
LetWdr denote the value of this problem. If the link constraints in the relaxed
system problem hold then
1
k
∑
i∈Rj
k∑
l=1
zi(l) =
1
k
∑
i∈Rj
1TMizi ≤
1
k
1T cj1 = cj . (4.2)
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This inequality essentially says that the link constraints should hold in ex-
pectation. Thus we have the following average system problem:
SYS_AVG[z;h, v,A, c]
Maximize
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
subject to
∑
i∈Rj
1
k
k∑
l=1
zi(l) ≤ cj ,∀j,
zi(l) ≥ zi(l + 1),∀i,∀l,
with its corresponding primal problem:
max
z:zi(l)≥zi(l+1)∀l,∀i
min
λ¯j≥0,∀j
∑
i
∑
l
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
+
∑
j
λ¯j

cj − ∑
i∈Rj
1
k
k∑
l=1
zi(l)

 , (V)
and the dual problem:
min
λ¯j≥0,∀j
max
z:zi(l)≥zi(l+1)∀l,∀i
∑
i
∑
l
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
+
∑
j
λ¯j

cj − ∑
i∈Rj
1
k
k∑
l=1
zi(l)

 , (VI)
where λ¯j ∈ R are the dual variables corresponding to the link constraints.
Let Wpa and Wda denote the values of these primal and dual problems re-
spectively.
Then we have the following relation:
Theorem 4.2. For any system problem defined by h, v,A and c, we have
Wps ≤Wpr = Wpa = Wda = Wdr = Wds.
Proof. As observed earlier, if we replace the conditionMi ∈ Ωk in the primal
relaxed problem (III) with the condition Mi ∈ Ω
∗
k, we get the primal system
problem (I). Since Ω∗k ⊂ Ωk, we have Wps ≤Wpr.
The constraint
∑
i∈Rj
1
k
∑k
l=1 zi(l) ≤ cj can equivalently be written as∑
i∈Rj
M¯izi ≤ cj1,
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for all j, where M¯i is the matrix with all its entries equal to 1/k. Thus, if
we replace Mi ∈ Ωk in the primal relaxed problem (III) with M¯i, we get
the primal average problem (V). This implies that Wpa ≤ Wpr. However,
as observed earlier in Equation (4.2), if for some fixed allocations z the link
constraints are satisfied with respect to any doubly stochastic matrixMi, then
they are also satisfied with respect to M¯i. Thus the maximum of the average
system problem SYS_AVG[z;h, v,A, c] is at least as much as the maximum
of the relaxed system problem SYS_REL[h, v,A, c]. Since the maximum of
the relaxed system problem is equal to the value of its corresponding primal
problem, we getWpa ≥Wpr. Thus, we have established that Wpr = Wpa.
The average system problem has a concave objective function with linear
constraints. Thus, strong duality holds, and we getWpa = Wda.
We now show thatWda = Wdr. FromWpr ≤Wdr andWpr = Wpa = Wda,
we get Wda ≤ Wdr. Suppose λj = λ¯j1. Then the objective function of the
relaxed dual problem (IV),
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l)) +
m∑
j=1
λTj

cj1− ∑
i∈Rj
Mizi


=
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l)) +
m∑
j=1
λ¯j

cj − ∑
i∈Rj
1
k
k∑
l=1
zi(l)

 ,
equals the objective function of the dual average problem (V). This implies
that Wdr ≤Wda. This established that Wda = Wdr.
Since any doubly stochastic matrix Mi is a convex combination of per-
mutation matrices by the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, in the dual prob-
lem (IV), for any fixed λj, zi, the optimum can be achieved by a permutation
matrix. This established that Wdr = Wds.
This completes the proof.
Thus the duality gap is a manifestation of the “hard” link constraints. In
the proof of the above theorem we saw that the relaxed problem is “equiva-
lent” to the average problem and strong duality holds for this relaxation. We
will later study the average problem in further detail (Section 5).
We observed earlier in Lemma 4.1 that if strong duality holds in the sys-
tem problem, then the optimum permutation profile π∗ satisfies (4.1). Con-
sider a simple example of two players sharing a single link. Suppose that,
at the optimum, λ(l) are the prices for l ∈ [k] corresponding to this link
under the different outcomes, and suppose not all of these are equal. Then
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the optimum permutation profile of the dual problem will align both play-
ers’ allocations in the same order, i.e. the high allocations of player 1 will be
aligned with the high allocations of player 2. However, we can directly see
from the system problem that an optimum π∗ should align the two players’
allocations in opposite order. The following example builds on this observa-
tion and shows that strong duality need not hold for the system problem.
Example 4.3. Consider the following example with two players {1, 2} and a
single link with capacity 2.9. Let k = 2. Let the corresponding CPT charac-
teristics of the two players be as follows:
h1(1) =
1
3
, h1(2) =
2
3
,
h2(1) =
5
6
, h2(2) =
1
6
,
v1(x) = log(x+ 0.05) + 3, v2(x) =
2 log(x+ 0.05) + 3(x+ 0.05)
5
+ 3.
For this problem, it is easy to see that π1 = (1, 2) and π2 = (2, 1) is an optimal
permutation. Solving the fixed-permutation system problem with respect to
this permutation we get optimal value equal to 7.5621. The corresponding
variable values are
z1(1) = y1(1) = 1.95, z1(2) = y1(2) = 0.95,
z2(1) = y2(2) = 1.95, z2(2) = y2(1) = 0.95,
and the dual variable values are
λ1(1) =
1
6
, λ1(2) =
2
3
,
and αi(l) = 0, for i = 1, 2, l = 1, 2. One can check that these satisfy the KKT
conditions.
Let us now evaluate the value of the dual problem (II). By symmetry, we
can assume without loss of generality that λ1(1) ≤ λ1(2). As a result, optimal
permutations for the dual problem are given by π1 = π2 = (1, 2). For fixed
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λ1(1) and λ1(2), we solve the following optimization problem:
max
z1(1)≥z1(2)≥0
z2(1)≥z2(2)≥0
1
3
log(z1(1) + 0.05) +
2
3
log(z1(2) + 0.05)
+
5
6
[
2 log(z2(1) + 0.05) + 3(z2(1) + 0.05)
5
]
+
1
6
[
2 log(z2(2) + 0.05) + 3(z2(2) + 0.05)
5
]
− λ1(1)[z1(1) + z2(1)] − λ1(2)[z1(2) + z2(2)]
+ 2.9[λ1(1) + λ1(2)] + 6.
(VII)
If λ1(1) ≤ 0.5, then the value of the problem (VII) is equal to ∞ (let
z2(1) → ∞). If λ1(1) > 0.5 (and hence λ1(2) > 0.5 because λ1(2) ≥ λ1(2)),
then we observe that the effective domain of maximization in the problem
(VII) is compact and problem (VII) has a finite value. Hence it is enough to
consider λ1(1) > 0.5. At the optimum there exist α1(1), α1(2), α2(1), α2(2) ≥
0 such that
λ1(1) =
1
3
1
z1(1) + 0.05
+ α1(1),
λ1(2) =
2
3
1
z1(2) + 0.05
− α1(1) + α1(2),
λ1(1) =
1
3
1
z2(1) + 0.05
+
1
2
+ α2(1),
λ1(2) =
1
15
1
z2(2) + 0.05
+
1
10
− α2(1) + α2(2),
and
α1(1)[z1(1)− z1(2)] = 0, α1(2)z1(2) = 0,
α2(1)[z2(1)− z2(2)] = 0, α2(2)z2(2) = 0.
We now consider each of the sixteen (4× 4) cases based on whether the
inequalities zi(l) ≥ zi(l + 1) for i = 1, 2 and l = 1, 2, hold strictly or not.
Case A1 (z1(1) = 0, z1(2) = 0). Then λ1(1) ≥ 1/0.15.
Case B1 (z1(1) > 0, z1(2) = 0). Then λ1(1) < 1/0.15, λ1(2) ≥ 2/0.15,
and
α1(1) = 0, z1(1) =
1
3λ1(1)
− 0.05.
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Case C1 (z1(1) = z1(2) > 0). Then λ1(2)/2 ≤ λ1(1) ≤ λ1(2), λ1(1) +
λ1(2) < 1/0.05, and
α1(1) =
2λ1(1) − λ1(2)
3
, α1(2) = 0, z1(1) = z1(2) =
1
λ1(1) + λ1(2)
− 0.05.
Case D1 (z1(1) > z1(2) > 0). Then λ1(1) < λ1(2)/2, 0 < λ1(1) <
1/0.15, 0 < λ1(2) < 2/0.15, and
α1(1) = 0, α1(2) = 0, z1(1) =
1
3λ1(1)
− 0.05, z1(2) =
2
3λ1(2)
− 0.05.
Case A2 (z2(1) = 0, z2(2) = 0). Then λ1(1) ≥ (1/0.15) + 0.5.
Case B2 (z2(1) > 0, z2(2) = 0). Then 0.5 < λ1(1) < 2.15/0.3, λ1(2) ≥
(1/0.75) + 0.1, and
α2(1) = 0, z2(1) =
2
6λ1(1) − 3
− 0.05.
Case C2 (z2(1) = z2(2) > 0). This is not possible since λ1(1) ≤ λ1(2).
Case D2 (z2(1) > z2(2) > 0). Then 0.5 < λ1(1) < 2.15/0.3, 0.1 <
λ1(2) < 2.15/1.5, and
α2(1) = 0, α2(2) = 0, z2(1) =
2
6λ1(1)− 3
− 0.05, z2(2) =
2
30λ1(2)− 3
− 0.05.
If case A1 or case A2 holds, then λ1(1) ≥ 1/0.15. For any fixed λ1(1), λ1(2),
by choosing zi(l), i = 1, 2, l = 1, 2 small enough (respecting the conditions
imposed by the corresponding cases), we get that the value of problem (VII)
is greater than or equal to 2.9∗(1/0.15) = 19.3333 > 7.5621. Similarly, if case
B1 holds, then λ1(2) ≥ 2/0.15, and we get that the value of problem (VII) is
greater than or equal to 2.9∗(2/0.15) = 38.6667 > 7.5621. For the remaining
4 cases, substituting the corresponding expressions for zi(l), i = 1, 2, l = 1, 2
in the objective function (VII) and evaluating the optimum over feasible pairs
(λ1(1), λ1(2)) for each pair of cases {C1,D1} × {B2,D2}, the minimum is
achieved for the case (C1,D2) and has value equal to 8.2757. Numerical eval-
uation for each of these cases gives rise to the minimum values as shown in
table 2. Thus the optimal dual value is 8.2757 and this is strictly greater than
the primal value.
Theorem 4.4. The primal problem (I) is NP-hard.
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B2 D2
C1 10.2284 8.2757
D1 10.1814 9.5006
Figure 2: The numbers in the cells denote the optimum value of the objective
function (VII) in the corresponding cases.
Proof. We describe a polynomial time procedure that reduces an instance of
the integer partition problem to a special case of the primal problem. Given
a set of positive integers {c1, c2, . . . , cn}, the integer partition problem is to
find a subset S ⊂ [n], such that∑
i∈S
ci =
∑
i/∈S
ci.
If such a set S exists, then we say that an integer partition exists. Consider a
network with n players and n+ 1 link constraints given by
yi ≤ ci,∀i ∈ [n], and
n∑
i=1
yi ≤
∑n
i=1 ci
2
.
It is easy to realize a network with these link constraints. Let k = 2. Let the
CPT characteristics of all the players be as follows:
hi(1) = 1− ǫ, hi(2) = ǫ, vi(xi) = xi,∀i ∈ [n],
where ǫ = 1/10. LetWps denote the optimal value of the system problem. We
show thatWps ≥ T := (1−ǫ)
∑
i∈[n] ci if and only if an integer partition exists.
Suppose an integer partition exists and is given by the set S, consider the
allocation πi = [1, 2] if i ∈ S and πi = [2, 1] otherwise, zi(1) = ci, zi(2) = 0
for all i ∈ [n]. The aggregate utility for this allocation is equal to T and hence
Wps ≥ T . Suppose Wps ≥ T . Then there an allocation, say z
∗ and π∗ with
aggregate utility at least T . Since k = 2, π∗ actually defines a partition of
[n], given by S = {i ∈ [n] : πi(1) = 1}. We have, the aggregate utility
W (1) +W (2) ≥ T,
where
W (1) :=
∑
i∈S
(1− ǫ)zi(1) +
∑
i/∈S
ǫzi(2),
W (2) :=
∑
i/∈S
(1− ǫ)zi(1) +
∑
i∈S
ǫzi(2).
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Hence at least one ofW (1) andW (2 is at least as big as T/2. Without loss of
generality, letW (1) ≥ T/2. Thus we have,
∑
i∈S
zi(1) +
ǫ
1− ǫ
∑
i/∈S
zi(2) ≥
∑
i∈[n] ci
2
.
However, since z∗ is feasible, the link constraints give
∑
i∈S
zi(1) +
∑
i/∈S
zi(2) ≤
∑
i∈[n] ci
2
.
Since ǫ < 1/2, we should have
∑
i/∈S zi(2) = 0 and
∑
i∈S zi(1) = (
∑
i∈[n] ci)/2,
implying that S forms an integer partition. This completes the proof.
5 Average SystemProblem andOptimal Lottery Struc-
ture
Suppose it is enough to ensure that the link constraints are satisfied in ex-
pectation, as in the average system problem. Consider the function V avgi (z¯i)
on R+ given by the value of the following optimization problem:
Maximize
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
subject to
1
k
k∑
l=1
zi(l) = z¯i,
zi(l) ≥ zi(l + 1),∀l ∈ [k].
(VIII)
Let Zi(z¯i) denote the set of feasible (zi(l))l∈[k] in the above problem for
any fixed z¯i ≥ 0. We observe that Zi(z¯i) is a closed and bounded polytope,
and hence V
avg
i (z¯i) is well defined.
Lemma 5.1. For any continuous, differentiable, concave and strictly increasing
value function vi(·), the function V
avg
i (·) is continuous, differentiable, concave
and strictly increasing in z¯i.
We prove this lemma in Appendic A. The average system problemSYS_AVG[z;h, v,A, c]
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can be written as
Maximize
n∑
i=1
V
avg
i (z¯i)
subject to
∑
i∈Rj
z¯i ≤ cj ,∀j,
z¯i ≥ 0,∀i.
Kelly [13] showed that this problem can be decomposed into user problems,
one for each user i,
Maximize V
avg
i (z¯i)− ρ¯iz¯i
subject to z¯i ≥ 0,
and a network problem,
Maximize
n∑
i=1
ρ¯iz¯i
subject to
∑
i∈Rj
z¯i ≤ cj ,∀j,
z¯i ≥ 0,∀i,
in the sense that there exist ρ¯i ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [n], such that the optimum solutions
z¯i of the user problems, for each i, solve the network problem and the aver-
age system problem. Note that this decomposition is different from the one
presented in Section 3. Here the network problem aims at maximizing its
total revenue
∑n
i=1 ρ¯iz¯i, instead of maximizing a weighted aggregate utility
where the utility is replaced with a proxy logarithmic function. The above
decomposition is not as useful as the decomposition in Section 3 in order to
develop iterative schemes that converge to equilibrium. However, the above
decomposition motivates the following user problem:
USER_AVG[zi; ρ¯i, hi, vi]
Maximize
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l))−
ρ¯i
k
k∑
l=1
zi(l)
subject to zi(l) ≥ zi(l + 1),∀l ∈ [k],
where, as before, zi(k + 1) = 0.
We observed in Proposition 4.2 that strong duality holds in the average
system problem. Let z∗ be the optimum lottery scheme that solves this prob-
lem. Then, first of all, z∗ satisfies z∗i (l) ≥ z
∗
i (l + 1) ∀i, l and is feasible in
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expectation, i.e., z¯∗ := (z¯∗i )i∈[n] ∈ F , where z¯
∗
i := (1/k)
∑
l z
∗
i (l). Further,
z∗ optimizes the objective function of the average system problem. Besides,
there exist λ¯∗j ≥ 0 for all j such that the primal average problem (V) and the
dual average problem (VI) each attain their optimum at z∗, (λ¯∗j , j ∈ [m]).
For player i, consider the price ρ¯∗i :=
∑
j∈Ji
λ¯∗j , which is obtained by sum-
ming the prices λ¯∗j corresponding to the links on player i’s route. From the
dual average problem (VI), fixing λ¯j = λ¯
∗
j ∀j, we get that the optimum lottery
allocation z∗i for player i should optimize the problemUSER_AVG[zi; ρ¯
∗
i , hi, vi].
We now impose some additional conditions on the probability weighting
function that are typically assumed based on empirical evidence and certain
psychological arguments [12]. We assume that the probability weighting
function wi(pi) is concave for small values of the probability pi and convex
for the rest. Formally, there exists a probability p˜i ∈ [0, 1] such that wi(pi)
is concave over the interval pi ∈ [0, p˜i] and convex over the interval [p˜i, 1].
Typically the point of inflection, p˜i, is around 1/3.
Let w∗i : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be the minimum concave function that dominates
wi(·), i.e., w
∗
i (pi) ≥ wi(pi) for all pi ∈ [0, 1]. Let p
∗
i ∈ [0, 1] be the smallest
probability such that w∗i (pi) is linear over the interval [p
∗
i , 1].
Lemma 5.2. Given the assumptions on wi(·), we have p
∗
i ≤ p˜i and w
∗
i (pi) =
wi(pi) for pi ∈ [0, p
∗
i ]. If p
∗
i < 1, then for any p
1
i ∈ [p
∗
i , 1), we have
wi(pi) ≤ wi(p
1
i ) + (pi − p
1
i )
1− wi(p
1
i )
1− p1i
. (5.1)
for all pi ∈ [p
1
i , 1].
A proof of this lemma is included in Appendix A. We now show that,
under certain conditions, the optimal lottery allocation z∗i satisfies
z∗i (l
∗) = z∗i (l
∗ + 1) = · · · = z∗i (k), (5.2)
where l∗ := min{l ∈ [k] : (l − 1)/k ≥ p∗i }, provided p
∗
i ≤ (k − 1)/k. As a
result, for a typical optimum lottery allocation, the lowest allocation occurs
with a large probability approximately equal to 1−p∗i , and with a few higher
allocations that we recognize as bonuses.
Proposition 5.3. For any average user problem USER_AVG[zi; ρ¯
∗
i , hi, vi] with a
strictly increasing, continuous, differentiable and strictly concave value function
vi(·), and a strictly increasing continuous probability weighting function wi(·)
(satisfying wi(0) = 0 and wi(1) = 1) such that p
∗
i ≤ (k − 1)/k, the optimum
lottery allocation z∗i satisfies Equation (5.2).
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Proof. The Lagrangian for the average user problem USER_AVG[zi; ρ¯
∗
i , hi, vi]
is
L(zi;αi) =
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l))−
ρ¯∗i
k
k∑
l=1
zi(l) +
k∑
l=1
αi(l)[zi(l)− zi(l + 1)],
where αi(l) ≥ 0 are the dual variables corresponding to the order constraints
zi(l) ≥ zi(l + 1), and αi(0) = 0. Differentiating with respect to zi(l), we get,
∂L(zi;αi)
∂zi(l)
= hi(l)v
′
i(zi(l))−
ρ¯∗i
k
+ αi(l)− αi(l − 1).
Since the problem USER_AVG[zi; ρ¯
∗
i , hi, vi] has a concave objective function
and linear constraints, there exist α∗i (l) ≥ 0 such that
hi(l)v
′
i(z
∗
i (l)) =
ρ¯∗i
k
− α∗i (l) + α
∗
i (l − 1),∀l ∈ [k], (5.3)
and
α∗i (l)[z
∗
i (l)− z
∗
i (l + 1)] = 0,∀l ∈ [k]. (5.4)
If z∗i consists of identical allocations then it trivially satisfies Equation (5.2).
If not, then there exists l1 ∈ {2, . . . , k} such that
z∗i (l
1 − 1) > z∗i (l
1) = z∗i (l
1 + 1) = · · · = z∗i (k),
i.e. z∗i (l
1) is the lowest allocation and occurs with probability (k− l1 +1)/k,
and the next lowest allocation is equal to z∗i (l
1− 1). Summing the equations
corresponding to l1 ≤ l ≤ k from (5.3), we get[
k∑
s=l1
hi(s)
]
v′i(z
∗
i (l
1)) =
(
k − l1 + 1
k
)
ρ¯∗i − α
∗
i (k) + α
∗
i (l
1 − 1). (5.5)
The equation corresponding to l = l1 − 1 in (5.3) says,
hi(l
1 − 1)v′i(z
∗
i (l
1 − 1)) =
ρ¯∗i
k
− α∗i (l
1 − 1) + α∗i (l
1 − 2). (5.6)
Since z∗i (l
1 − 1) > z∗i (l
1), from (5.4), we have α∗i (l
1 − 1) = 0. Thus from
(5.5) and (5.6), we have
hi(l
1 − 1)v′i(z
∗
i (l
1 − 1)) ≥
ρ¯∗i
k
≥
1
k − l1 + 1
[
k∑
s=l1
hi(s)
]
v′i(z
∗
i (l
1)).
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Further, since vi(·) is strictly concave and strictly increasing, z
∗
i (l
1 − 1) >
z∗i (l
1) implies 0 < v′i(z
∗
i (l
1 − 1) < v′i(z
∗
i (l
1)). Thus,
hi(l
1 − 1) >
1
k − l1 + 1
[
k∑
s=l1
hi(s)
]
. (5.7)
If (l1 − 2)/k ≥ p∗i , then
hi(l
1 − 1) = wi
(
l1 − 1
k
)
− wi
(
l1 − 2
k
)
≤
1
k − l1 + 1
[
wi(1)− wi
(
l1 − 1
k
)]
=
1
k − l1 + 1
[
k∑
s=l1
hi(s)
]
. (5.8)
where the inequality follows from (5.1) with p1i = (l
1 − 2)/k and pi = (l
1 −
1)/k. However, (5.8) contradicts (5.7) and hence (l1−2)/k < p∗i . This proves
the lemma.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We saw that if we take the probabilistic sensitivity of players into account,
then lottery allocation improves the ex ante aggregate utility of the players.
We considered the RDU model, a special case of CPT utility, to model prob-
abilistic sensitivity. This model, however, is restricted to reward allocations,
and it would be interesting to extend it to a general CPT model with refer-
ence point and loss aversion. This will allow us to study loss allocations as
in punishment or burden allocations, for example criminal justice, military
drafting, etc.
For any fixed permutation profile, we showed the existence of equilibrium
prices in a market-based mechanism to implement an optimal lottery. We
also saw that finding the optimal permutation profile is an NP-hard problem.
We note that the system problem has parallels in cross-layer optimization in
wireless [16] andmulti-route networks [30]. Several heuristic methods have
helped achieve approximately optimal solutions in cross-layer optimization.
Similar methods need to be developed for our system problem. We leave this
for future work.
The hardness in the system problem comes from hard link constraints.
Hence, by relaxing these conditions to hold only in expectation, we derived
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some qualitative features of the optimal lottery structure under the typical
assumptions on the probability weighting function of each agent in the RDU
model. As observed, the players typically ensure their minimum allocation
with high probability, and gamble for higher rewards with low probability.
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Suppose problem (I) and its dual (II) have the same
value. The value of (I) is same as that of the system problemSYS[z, π;h, v,A, c].
Let us denote the objective function by
Θ(π, z, λ) :=
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(zi(l))
+
m∑
j=1
k∑
l=1
λj(l)

cj − ∑
i∈Rj
zi(πi(l))

 .
SinceF is a polytope, for any fixed permutation profile π, the set of feasible z
is closed and bounded. The function Θ(π, z, λ) is continuous in z and hence
the fixed-permutation system problem SYS_FIX[z;π, h, v,A, c] has a bounded
value. We also note that this value is non-negative. Since there are finitely
many permutation profiles π ∈
∏
i Sk, maximizing over these, we get that
the system problem has a bounded non-negative value, say W , achieved say
at z∗ and π∗. Thus
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(z
∗
i (l)) = W, (A.1)
and the lottery z∗ is feasible with respect to the permutation profile π∗, i.e.
z∗i (l) ≥ z
∗
i (l + 1) for all i ∈ [n], l ∈ [k] and∑
i∈Rj
z∗i (π
∗
i (l)) ≤ cj for all j ∈ [m], l ∈ [k]. (A.2)
If this were not true, then the minimum of the objective function Θ(π∗, z∗, λ)
with respect to λ would be −∞ and notW ≥ 0.
The value of the dual problem (II) is equal to W . Consider the function
Θd : R
m×k
+ → R, given by maximizing over the objective function in problem
(II), with respect to π and z for a fixed λ ≥ 0,
Θd(λ) := max
pii∈Sk∀i,
z:zi(l)≥zi(l+1)∀i,l
Θ(π, z, λ).
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We note that the function Θd(λ) is lower semi-continuous, since the function
Θ(π, z, λ) is continuous in λ. Since (vi(·),∀i) are concave strictly increas-
ing functions, there exists a sufficiently large finite λ such that 0 ≤ M :=
Θd(λ) < ∞. It follows that the minimum of Θd(λ) is achieved over the do-
main defined by λj(l) ∈ [0,M/(minj cj)] for all j, l. Since this is a bounded
region and the function Θd(λ) is lower semi-continuous, there exists a λ
∗
such that Θd(λ
∗) = minλ≥0Θd(λ) = W .
Since Θd(λ
∗) = W , we have Θ(π∗, z∗, λ∗) ≤ W . However, from (A.1),
(A.2) and the fact that λ∗j (l) ≥ 0 for all j, l we get Θ(π
∗, z∗, λ∗) ≥W . Hence
Θ(π∗, z∗, λ∗) = W . Thus the maximum in the definition ofΘd(λ
∗) is achieved
at z∗, π∗. This implies π∗i satisfies (4.1) for all i.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Let z¯i ≥ 0 and τ > 0. Let z
∗
i ∈ Zi(z¯i) be such that
V avgi (z¯i) =
∑k
l=1 hi(l)vi(z
∗
i (l)). We have, (z
∗
i (l) + τ)l∈[k] ∈ Zi(z¯i + τ) and
V
avg
i (z¯i + τ) ≥
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(z
∗
i (l) + τ) >
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(z
∗
i (l)) = V
avg
i (z¯i),
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that vi(·) is strictly increas-
ing. This establishes that the function V
avg
i (z¯i) is strictly increasing.
Let z¯1i , z¯
2
i ≥ 0 and σ ∈ [0, 1]. Let z
1
i ∈ Zi(z¯
1
i ) and z
2
i ∈ Zi(z¯
2
i ) be such
that V
avg
i (z¯
1
i ) =
∑k
l=1 hi(l)vi(z
1
i (l)) and V
avg
i (z¯
2
i ) =
∑k
l=1 hi(l)vi(z
2
i (l)). Let
zσi := σz
1
i (l)+ (1−σ)z
2
i (l) and z¯
σ
i := σz¯
1
i (l)+ (1−σ)z¯
2
i (l). Then z
σ
i ∈ Zi(z¯
σ
i )
and by the concavity of vi(·), we have
V
avg
i (z¯
σ
i ) ≥
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(z
σ
i (l)) ≥
k∑
l=1
hi(l)
[
σvi(z
1
i (l)) + (1− σ)vi(z
2
i (l))
]
= σV
avg
i (z¯
1
i ) + (1− σ)V
avg
i (z¯
2
i ).
This establishes that the function V
avg
i (z¯i) is concave. This implies that V
avg
i (z¯i)
is continuous and directionally differentiable at each z¯i > 0, and we have the
following relation between its left and right directional derivatives (see, for
example, [24]):
d
dz¯i
V
avg
i (z¯i−) ≥
d
dz¯i
V
avg
i (z¯i+), for all z¯i > 0. (A.3)
Further, if (z¯ti)t≥1 is a sequence such that z¯
t
i → 0, and z
t
i ∈ Zi(z¯
t
i) for all t ≥ 1,
then zti(l)→ 0 for all l ∈ [k]. By the continuity of the function vi(·), we have
that the function V
avg
i (z¯i) is continuous at z¯i = 0.
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Let z¯i > 0, and let τ
t := 1/t, for t ≥ 1. As before, let z∗i ∈ Zi(z¯i) be such
that V
avg
i (z¯i) =
∑k
l=1 hi(l)vi(z
∗
i (l)). Since z¯i > 0 and (1/k)
∑k
l=1 z
∗
i (l) = z¯i,
we have z∗i (l) > z
∗
i (l + 1) for at least one l ∈ [k]. Let lˆ ∈ [k] be the smallest
such l. For t ≥ 1, let zt+i be given by
zt+i (l) :=
{
z∗i (l) +
k
lˆ
τ t, for 1 ≤ l ≤ lˆ,
z∗i (l), for lˆ < l ≤ k.
Note that zt+i ∈ Zi(z¯i + τ
t). We have,
V
avg
i (z¯i + τ
t)− V
avg
i (z¯i)−
kτ t
lˆ
lˆ∑
l=1
hi(l)v
′
i(z
∗
i (l))
≥
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(z
t+
i (l))−
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(z
∗
i (l))−
kτ t
lˆ
lˆ∑
l=1
hi(l)v
′
i(z
∗
i (l))
=
lˆ∑
l=1
hi(l)
[
vi(z
∗
i (l) + kτ
t/lˆ)− vi(z
∗
i (l))−
kτ t
lˆ
v′i(z
∗
i (l))
]
.
Let γ∗ := k
lˆ
∑lˆ
l=1 hi(l)v
′
i(z
∗
i (l)). We have,
d
dz¯i
V avgi (z¯i+) ≥ lim inft→∞
V
avg
i (z¯i + τ
t)− V
avg
i (z¯i)
τ t
≥ γ∗. (A.4)
Similarly, for t ≥ ⌈k/z∗i (lˆ)⌉ (here, ⌈·⌉ denotes the ceiling function), let z
t−
i
be given by
zt−i (l) :=
{
z∗i (l)−
k
lˆ
τ t, for 1 ≤ l ≤ lˆ,
z∗i (l), for lˆ < l ≤ k.
We observe that zt−i ∈ Zi(z¯i − τ
t), for all t ≥ ⌈k/z∗i (lˆ)⌉, and we have
V
avg
i (z¯i)− V
avg
i (z¯i − τ
t)−
kτ t
lˆ
lˆ∑
l=1
hi(l)v
′
i(z
∗
i (l))
≤
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(z
∗
i (l))−
k∑
l=1
hi(l)vi(z
t−
i (l))−
kτ t
lˆ
lˆ∑
l=1
hi(l)v
′
i(z
∗
i (l))
=
lˆ∑
l=1
hi(l)
[
vi(z
∗
i (l))− vi(z
∗
i (l)− kτ
t/lˆ)−
kτ t
lˆ
v′i(z
∗
i (l))
]
.
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This implies,
d
dz¯i
V
avg
i (z¯i−) ≤ lim sup
t→∞
V avgi (z¯i)− V
avg
i (z¯i − τ
t)
τ t
≤ γ∗. (A.5)
From (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5), we have
d
dz¯i
V
avg
i (z¯i−) =
d
dz¯i
V
avg
i (z¯i+) = γ
∗. (A.6)
This establishes that the function V
avg
i (z¯i) is differentiable and completes the
proof.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Consider the function w¯i : [0, 1] → [0, 1], given by
w¯i(pi) :=
{
w∗i (pi) for 0 ≤ pi < p˜i,
w∗i (p˜i) + (pi − p˜i)
1−w∗i (p˜i)
1−p˜i
for p˜i ≤ pi ≤ 1.
Since w∗i is concave on [0, 1], one can verify that the function w¯i is also con-
cave on [0, 1]. Since w∗i dominates wi, we have w
∗
i (p˜i) ≥ wi(p˜i). Since the
function wi(pi) is convex on the interval [p˜i, 1], we have wi(pi) ≤ w¯i(pi), for
pi ∈ [p˜i, 1]. However, since w
∗
i is the minimum concave function that dom-
inates wi, we get w¯i = w
∗
i . Thus, w
∗
i is linear over the interval [p˜i, 1], and
hence p∗i ≤ p˜i.
Suppose p˜i = 1. Thenwi(·) is a concave function on the unit interval [0, 1],
and hence w∗i (pi) = wi(pi), for pi ∈ [0, 1] ⊃ [0, p
∗
i ]. Further, if p
∗
i < 1, then
wi(pi) is linear over [p
∗
i , 1], and inequality (5.1) holds, in fact, with equality.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.2, if p˜i = 1.
For the rest of the proof we assume p˜i < 1. Define gi : [0, 1) → R+ as
gi(pi) :=
1− wi(pi)
1− pi
.
We now provide an alternate characterization of the function w∗i and the
point p∗i . Let pˆi ∈ [0, 1] be given by
pˆi := min argmin
pi∈[0,p˜i]
{g(pi)} .
The existence of pˆi is guaranteed by the continuity of the function gi(pi) on
the compact interval [0, p˜i]. Let aˆi := gi(pˆi). Since wi(pi) is convex over
the interval [p˜i, 1], the function gi(pi) is nondecreasing over [p˜i, 1). Hence
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gi(pi) ≥ gi(pˆi), for pi ∈ [0, 1). Substituting the expression for gi(·) and rear-
ranging, we get
wi(pi) ≤ wi(pˆi) + aˆi(pi − pˆi),
for pi ∈ [0, 1]. Since the function wi(pi) is concave on the interval [0, pˆi] and
the linear function wi(pˆi) + aˆi(pi − pˆi) dominates wi(pi) on [0, 1], we have
that the following function wˆi(pi) is concave on [0, 1]:
wˆi(pi) :=
{
wi(pi) for 0 ≤ pi < pˆi,
wi(pˆi) + aˆi(pi − pˆi) for pˆi ≤ pi ≤ 1.
It follows that w∗i (pi) = wˆi(pi) for pi ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, p
∗
i ≤ pˆi and w
∗
i (pi) =
wˆi(pi) = wi(pi) for pi ∈ [0, p
∗
i ]. If pˆi = 0, then p
∗
i = pˆi. If pˆi > 1, then from
the definition of pˆi, we have gi(pi) > gi(pˆi) for pi ∈ [0, pˆi), and this implies
that pˆi = p
∗
i .
We now prove inequality (5.1). Since p˜i < 1 we have p
∗
i < 1. Rearrang-
ing we get that inequality (5.1) is equivalent to showing that the function
gi(pi) is non-decreasing over the interval [p
∗
i , 1). As observed earlier, gi(pi) is
non-decreasing over the interval [p˜i, 1). Hence it is enough to show that the
function gi(pi) is non-decreasing on [p
∗
i , p˜i]. Suppose, on the contrary, there
exist p1i , p
2
i ∈ [p
∗
i , p˜i] such that p
1
i < p
2
i and gi(p
1
i ) > gi(p
2
i ). Since p
∗
i = pˆi, and
from the definition of pˆi, we have p
1
i > p
∗
i and gi(p
∗
i ) ≤ gi(p
2
i ). Since, gi(pi)
is a continuous function, there exist pi ∈ [p
∗
i , p
1
i ) such that gi(pi) = gi(p
2
i ).
Thus we have pi < p
1
i < p
2
i such that gi(p
1
i ) > gi(pi) = gi(p
2
i ). However, this
contradicts the concavity of wi(pi) on [p
∗
i , p˜i]. This completes the proof.
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